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Introduction
Narrowly understood, veganism is the practice of
excluding all animal products from one’s diet,
with the exception of human milk. More broadly,
veganism is not only a food ethics, but it encom-
passes all other areas of life. As deﬁned by the
Vegan Society when it became an established
charity in the UK in 1979, veganism is best under-
stood as “a philosophy and way of living which
seeks to exclude – as far as is possible and
practicable – all forms of exploitation of, and
cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any
other purpose; and by extension, promotes the
development and use of animal-free alternatives
for the beneﬁt of humans, animals and the envi-
ronment” (Vegan Society 2016b).
The Vegan Society was founded in 1944 in
Leicester by Donald Watson (1910–2005), his
wife, Dorothy, and ﬁve other friends. But, like
vegetarian principles, vegan principles have been
around for much longer – for example, among
adherents of Jainism who avoid doing any sort
of harm to animals. Other famous vegan advo-
cates, before the term was coined byWatson, were
the British doctor William Lambe (1765–1848),
who adopted a vegan diet based on health and
ethical considerations, and the British poet Percy
Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), who publicly
objected to the consumption of dairy and eggs.
In a recent poll, it was estimated that there are
at least 542,000 vegans in Britain, a steep increase
from the 150,000 estimated in 2006 (Vegan Soci-
ety 2016a). In the USA, a recent study showed
that 3.3% of the population declared to be vege-
tarian, half of which claim to be vegan – that is,
around ﬁve million people (The Vegetarian
Resource Group 2016).
There are two main moral justiﬁcations for
veganism, both of which rely on a common
assumption: that sentience, i.e., the capacity to
feel pleasure and pain, is the necessary and sufﬁ-
cient trait to be morally considerable. (Although it
is a disputed matter whether insects possess this
trait or not, vegans tend to avoid the consumption
of products such as honey or the use of products
like silk, and generally oppose the idea of eating
insects. Cf. McWilliams 2014.) In what follows,
I present these two arguments and a third one
which, although less popular, captures some core
intuitions among vegans. I then present a chal-
lenge faced by veganism and two arguments that
reject it as discriminatory, and brieﬂy conclude.
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Arguments for Veganism
The Argument Against Unnecessary Suffering
Vegans and vegetarians coincide that the human
interest in nourishment and gustatory pleasure
derived from consuming nonhuman ﬂesh is
largely outweighed by the interests of nonhumans
in not being subject to the conditions of factory
farms. Moreover, vegans accept the most inﬂuen-
tial argument for vegetarianism, known as the
welfarist argument. This could be summarized
thus:
P1. It is morally wrong to cause unnecessary
suffering to nonhuman animals.
P2. The production process of meat and of many
other nonhuman animal products causes
unnecessary suffering to nonhuman animals.
C: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro-
ducer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so
forth) in the production process of meat and of
many other nonhuman animal products.
The main complaint of vegans against vegetar-
ians, however, is that the second, factual premise
does not go far enough and should be replaced by
the following one:
P2’. The production process of all animal prod-
ucts causes unnecessary suffering to
nonhuman animals.
This leads to the following conclusion:
C’: It is morally wrong to participate (as a pro-
ducer, distributor, consumer, and so on and so
forth) in the production process of all
nonhuman animal products.
For vegans, endorsing the production process
of some animal products (paradigmatically, free-
range dairy and eggs) while banning others is
misinformed at best and hypocritical at worst. It
is misinformed at best, because it ignores the fact
that even the most progressive animal-rearing
practices inﬂict unnecessary suffering on the ani-
mals involved. For example, in free-range farms,
male chicks and free-range laying hens who are no
longer productive are routinely killed, and painful
debeaking remains a standard procedure. It is
hypocritical at worst, because it seeks to legiti-
mize certain forms of animal rearing while
condemning others, occluding the cruelty inherent
to these practices.
Depending on how they interpret P2’, vegans
can be divided into two groups. On the one hand,
principled vegans believe that it is simply not the
case that the rearing of nonhuman animals for
food can be done in a way that causes no suffer-
ing. It is therefore always impermissible to con-
sume all animal products. On the other hand,
contingent vegans believe that under current con-
ditions it is morally wrong to consume all
nonhuman animal products, but this is not inevi-
table and could change in the future – for instance,
if our patterns of consumption and modes of pro-
duction changed radically.
Among both groups, moreover, there is a sub-
set who aspires not merely to change human diets
into vegan diets, but to turn the whole natural
world into a vegan world where suffering is inso-
far as possible eradicated. Along these lines, Jeff
McMahan asks whether we should gradually get
rid of carnivorous species in their entirety, given
that they cause so much pain to others.
McMahan’s point is that, “even if we are not
required to prevent suffering among animals in
the wild for which we are not responsible, we do
have a moral reason to prevent it” – so long as our
acting on that reason does not bring about worse
effects than those we could prevent, like massive
ecosystemic imbalances and loss of biodiversity
(McMahan 2010, his emphases). This position
has been identiﬁed by some as a reductio against
the ideals of veganism.
The Argument Against Exploitation
This argument, also known as the abolitionist
argument, runs as follows:
P1: It is morally wrong to treat sentient beings as
property.
P2: Nonhuman animals are sentient beings.
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P3: The production process of all nonhuman ani-
mal products requires treating them as
property.
C: It is morally wrong to participate in any way
(as a producer, distributor, consumer, and so on
and so forth) in the production process of all
nonhuman animal products.
Contra welfarists, who seek to improve the
living conditions of farmed animals (for example,
by advocating for larger cages for factory farm
hens, by demanding that more humane slaughter
methods be employed, etc.), abolitionists seek a
total ban on nonhuman animal production which,
for them, is synonymous with exploitation. As
their name reveals, abolitionists regard their
quest as analogous to the quest of those who
rejected human slavery: just as the latter did not
demand a better treatment for slaves, but the end
of the institution as such, contemporary abolition-
ists do not wish to better regulate the meat and
animal production industry, but ﬁght to put a
deﬁnitive end to it.
Gary Francione and Anna Chorlton summarize
abolitionism in six principles. First, there is no
morally relevant trait that distinguishes humans
from nonhumans that justiﬁes treating the latter as
property and, therefore, as having mere economic
use for us. Just as treating humans as property is
inconsistent with recognizing all humans as mem-
bers of the moral community, treating nonhuman
animals as property goes against their recognition
as members of the moral community. All kinds of
animal use, even humane ones, are thus
unjustiﬁed. Second, if we recognize the right not
to be treated as property, we must not seek to
regulate, but plainly to abolish all institutionalized
animal exploitation. It is morally wrong and prac-
tically ineffective to negotiate with factory farms
better terms and conditions to promote animal
welfare, because this will only result in them
continuing to exploit nonhuman animals while
making consumers more comfortable about their
food choices. Third, veganism is the moral base-
line for animal rights advocates, and vegan non-
violent education should be the cornerstone of
animal rights advocacy. There is no third path
between veganism and exploitation. Fourth, the
only trait that matters to be morally considerable is
sentience. Fifth, all forms of human discrimina-
tion, including speciesism, ought to be rejected.
Sixth, nonviolence is the core principle of aboli-
tionism (Francione and Charlton 2015).
Some radical abolitionists claim that at the core
of their position is the idea that human and
nonhuman animals are moral equals and have a
right not to be treated as resources of others. This
is why killing animals for food is always wrong.
In order for this idea to gain traction, two major
assumptions over which most human cultures
have been constructed over centuries need to be
debunked: ﬁrst, that human interests are more
important than nonhuman interests and that
human lives are worth more than nonhuman
lives. Let me present two of the most well-
known arguments used to support these claims
and the abolitionist’s reply (Bernstein 2015).
When it comes to interests, it has been typically
argued that the interests of individuals who are
claimed to possess rationality (i.e., humans) ought
to count more than those of individuals who are
claimed to lack such capacity (i.e., most
nonhumans). It is not the case, however, that
humans consistently act on this prescription. For
one thing, we do not grant a higher moral status to
humans with a higher degree of rationality; for
another, we do grant moral status to humans who
completely lack this capacity. This shows that
speciesism (the term popularized by Peter Singer
to refer to our unjustiﬁable bias toward members
of our own species) determines our moral behav-
ior. When it comes to the value of human lives
vis-à-vis the lives of nonhumans, a stock argu-
ment in defense of giving more weight to the
former comes from John Stuart Mill’s famous
motto that “it is better to be a human dissatisﬁed
than a pig satisﬁed” (Mill 2015, 124). Humans are
claimed to feel both higher and lower pleasures,
whereas nonhumans are claimed to feel only the
latter. Among the higher pleasures that humans
can feel are those connected to our future plans
and projects. Nonhumans, by contrast, are always
tied to their present situation. In conclusion, our
lives should be valued more than theirs. But this
argument is problematic. To begin with, it is not
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obvious why a life fully engaged in the present
ought to be deemed less worthy than one always
anxious about future possibilities. Furthermore, if
this were the case, we should then assign more
value to the lives of humans whose life prospects
are more sophisticated, but we don’t – a further
mark that what is at work behind these arguments
is the speciesist’s prejudice.
For some critics, one of the most troubling
consequences of endorsing full-ﬂedged abolition-
ism is that the number of farmed animals and also
pets would radically diminish, eventually
disappearing – the assumption being that any rela-
tionship between humans and domesticated
nonhumans will necessarily be exploitative. The
earth’s landscape in an abolitionist utopia would
thus be one of stark division and limited inter-
course between humans and wild nonhuman ani-
mals, where domesticated nonhumans would
have gone extinct (Wayne 2013 and Zamir
2004). Another focus of criticism refers to the
second and third points mentioned by Francione
and Chorlton. By denying the possibility of a
morally acceptable third path between veganism
and exploitation, abolitionists hinder rather than
promote “pro-animal strategic protest” that seeks
to create better living conditions for farmed ani-
mals (Zamir 2004, 368). To the former charge,
abolitionists may reply that more is not necessar-
ily better, and that it is morally preferable to have a
world with fewer, rather than more, lives that
ought not to be lived. That domestication has
been considered for centuries an acceptable prac-
tice is no justiﬁcation for its continuation (the
possibility of there being a lamb or pig raised for
meat, but leading a ﬂourishing, but short life is
thus precluded). To the latter charge, meanwhile,
abolitionists may respond that creating better con-
ditions does not address the real problem, which
is that the practice itself is wrong.
The Argument Against Negative Global
Health Impacts
While less mainstream, an innovative defense of
veganism refers to the overwhelmingly negative
Global Health Impacts (GHIs) associated with
non-vegan diets. Starting from the assumption
that health, holistically understood, is the most
important moral value, Jan Deckers develops a
moral theory based on duties to minimize negative
Global Health Impacts (GHIs) or to maximize
positive GHIs, where GHIs are a unit of measure-
ment to evaluate the effects of our actions on the
health of all biological organisms (Deckers 2011).
These effects are global because the concept of
health is holistic, encompassing all aspects con-
ducive to ﬂourishing, and because they take into
account the consequences of our actions not only
for our own health but also for the health of other
existing and not yet existing humans and
nonhumans. The resulting prescription is quali-
ﬁed moral veganism which, while not setting a
total ban on the consumption of animal products,
maintains that vegan diets ought to be the default
diets for the vast majority of the human population
(Deckers 2016; for another version of veganism
that tolerates exceptions, see McPherson 2016).
To safeguard their psychological health, more-
over, Deckers suggests that human moral agents
should endorse animalism, deﬁned as “an interest
in attributing greater moral signiﬁcance to either
dead or living animals than to other biological
organisms,” and compound it with evolutionism,
“an interest in attributing greater moral signiﬁ-
cance to those animals biologically closer to us”
(Deckers 2016). Contra those wary of being
accused of defending prejudices, Deckers happily
acknowledges that keeping these will help to cre-
ate overall positive GHIs (which is tantamount to
saying that it would diminish negative ones) and
should therefore be maintained. All these ideas
should be realized by the Vegan Project, a political
project that aims to pass laws that would authorize
the consumption of nonhuman animal products
only in a very limited range of cases (Deckers
2013, 2016).
Because of his holistic deﬁnition of health,
Deckers’ defense of qualiﬁed veganism highlights
a moral concern with the consumption of animals
who die naturally or accidentally, an issue that has
been largely overlooked by advocates of the ﬁrst
two arguments. It also encompasses two argu-
ments for this dietary choice that are more popular
among laymen than with philosophers. One is that
qualiﬁed veganism is better for human health
(zoonoses, or diseases transmitted from
4 Veganism
nonhumans to humans, being one major source of
concern in relation to non-vegan diets). The other
is that veganism is the best dietary choice if we
care about the environment, i.e., if we care about
the health of the planet as a whole. If the majority
of the world population stopped consuming ani-
mal products, this would save enormous amounts
of energy, soil, and water; it would drastically
diminish the pollution of air and watercourses
with organic and industrial residues; and it
would cut greenhouse gas emissions by 18 %,
more than the transport industry (FAO 2006; see
also▶Vegetarianism, where a similar argument is
presented).
Arguments Against Veganism
Does Veganism Really Minimize Harm?
Perhaps the main moral motivation for vegans
who reject the consumption of all animal products
because of the suffering involved in their creation
is that, through their dietary choices, they believe
themselves to be abiding by what the animals
rights theorist, Tom Regan, calls the Minimize
Harm Principle (MHP):
. . .whenever we ﬁnd ourselves in a situation where
all the options at hand will produce some harm to
those who are innocent, we must choose that option
that will result in the least total sum of harm (Regan
2004, 302).
That vegans actually realize this principle,
however, has been questioned. As Steven Davis
pointed out in a seminal article, given the large
numbers of ﬁeld animals killed by industrial farm-
ing, theMHPwould seem to require following not
a strictly vegan diet, but rather a diet that
complemented plant-based food with pasture-fed
free-range cattle and their derived products (Davis
2002). Davis’s proposal – succinctly character-
ized as the burger vegan view – might be none-
theless rejected by vegans on at least three
different grounds (Lamey 2007). First, not only
are Davis’s empirical data extremely limited for
supporting the sweeping claim he makes; these
data, based on barely two studies, also do not
distinguish between animals killed by their pred-
ators as a result of the harvesting process (like
mice killed by owls) and those directly killed by
the agricultural machinery employed. By failing
to make this distinction, Davis has either to
acknowledge that predation in nature is a moral
evil that has to be eliminated (a contentious posi-
tion defended by a small subgroup of vegans, as
shown above), or else do the math again and
accept that fewer animals are directly killed by a
purely vegan regime than by a mixed regime such
as that proposed by him. Second, livestock farms
cause harms to humans that vegan farms don’t.
Among such harms are the production of manure,
which is a carrier of diseases such as Escherichia
coli; a larger number of accidents among workers;
dangerous jobs at slaughterhouses; and the contri-
bution to global warming due to methane emis-
sions (Lamey 2007, 340–41). These harms should
also be taken into account. Third, Davis does not
distinguish between accidental and deliberate
harms, ignoring the fact that deaths caused by
accident are standardly not deemed as wrong as
deaths brought about deliberately. To this last
point, Davis can of course reply that it is at least
doubtful that deaths systematically caused by
agricultural methods ﬁt the deﬁnition of acciden-
tal; or, as he actually does, he can reply that deaths
are deaths, no matter whether they are brought
about intentionally or not (Davis 2002, 392).
If the moral relevance of the distinction
between accidental and deliberate harms is
rejected, a different way to defend veganism
against burger veganism is to remark that what is
problematic about diets that include nonhuman
animal products is that they use nonhumans
merely as a bodily means for the nonvital ends
of others – where being treated as a bodily means
requires that its body is necessary to achieve the
ends of others, it does not want to be treated in that
way, and the loss of well-being when treated that
way greatly exceeds the loss of well-being of the
others when their ends are not met (Bruers 2015,
272–73). Because the agricultural systems behind
vegan diets do not require using nonhumans as
bodily means, they should be preferred. It could
be counter-argued, however, that not only using
nonhumans as bodily means but also foreseeably
harming them is morally problematic, and that,
insofar as vegan agriculture foreseeably causes
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the deaths of thousands of mice, rats, opossums,
rabbits, and other small ﬁeld animals, it is not
without moral blemish.
Despite its problems, the burger vegan view
must be taken seriously by vegans, insofar as it
suggests a different trade-off for those who wish
to comply with the MHP. Pointing out that there
might be such a trade-off, however, does not go
against veganism unless enough empirical evi-
dence is gathered in its support. In the meantime,
vegans can still claim that, in the face of episte-
mological uncertainty, abstaining from the con-
sumption of all animal products seems like the
least bad path to take if one is concerned with
the minimization of unnecessary human and
nonhuman suffering.
Meaningful Omnivorism
A common critique against veganism, also leveled
against vegetarianism, is that it severs our connec-
tion with the natural world and reinforces the
anthropocentric paradigm, whereby we see our-
selves as superior to all other beings. Dominique
Lestel, for example, argues that to avoid eating
meat and all other nonhuman animal products
denies our own animality and is therefore a ges-
ture of anthropocentric superiority. Contra
Regan’s dictum that we should avoid insofar as
possible harming others (and that this should be
reﬂected in our eating habits), Lestel’s claim is
that we should instead embrace the cruelty
embedded in life: to eat meat and other nonhuman
animal products is to celebrate our relationship
with the latter (Lestel 2014). Not everything
goes, of course: like other meaningful omnivores
(see, for example, Pollan 2006), Lestel cautions
against greedy meat-eaters as well as against
unconcerned ones. Just like native groups like
the Algonquin in North America used every single
bit of their prey and thanked it, so should we turn
meat-eating into a ceremony; and just like they did
not take more than needed, so shouldn’t
we – which means rejecting contemporary West-
ern hypercarnivorism.
A Feminist Critique
Veganism has also come under attack by some
feminist writers who see it as a perpetuation of
the Western androcentric paradigm where adult,
middle-class males in industrialized countries are
physiologically privileged to attain the moral ideal
(George 1994). Those who cannot opt for
veganism – because it might be nutritionally inad-
equate (like for babies, pregnant women, and the
elderly), culturally alien (like for the Inuit), or
economically prohibitive (like for some urban
poor) – are excused by vegan theorists. By rou-
tinely excusing what they consider to be morally
wrong, however, critics point out that the latter
end up systematically discriminating against the
vast majority of the human population. Veganism
should therefore not be considered as the morally
correct dietary choice, but one choice among
many others depending on individual and social
circumstances.
Conclusion
Veganism is a growing dietary choice, especially
popular among young urban dwellers in devel-
oped countries. I offered three main arguments
as to why one may opt for veganism: to avoid
the suffering of nonhuman animals; to avoid the
exploitation and, therefore, rights violation, of
nonhuman animals; and to diminish the amount
of negative Global Health Impacts, i.e., to best
keep one’s individual health, and the health of
human and nonhuman others. I have suggested,
moreover, that vegans who wish to abide by the
Minimize Harm Principle face a challenge: given
the large numbers of animals who die because of
current agricultural methods, it is an open ques-
tion whether pure veganism (rather than, for
instance, a mixed diet of country mice killed by
the plow plus vegetables) should be the morally
preferred option. I then pointed to two criticisms
of veganism: ﬁrst, that it further separates us from
the natural world, and second, that it perpetuates
the androcentric Western paradigm, where adult,
middle-class urban males seem to be best ﬁtted to
attain this moral ideal. All in all, the growing
attention on the one hand toward what constitutes
an ethical diet and, on the other hand, toward the
moral status of nonhuman animals suggests that
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veganism will become center stage in coming
discussions of food ethics.
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